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Fast Facts:
• There are 12 federally recognized Indian tribes, 10 of which have police departments.
• The Urban Cooperation Act authorizes local governments to enter into public safety 
cooperative agreements with Indian tribes.
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Jurisdiction in Indian country is complicated by federal laws, policies, and court decisions. Police offi cers in Indian coun-try are asked to navigate a formidable body of law to de-
termine what authority they may wield in a variety of situations. 
Offi cers, who must treat every routine traffi c stop as a potentially 
life-threatening situation, must consider the location of an alleged 
crime, their current location, the political identity of the alleged 
perpetrator, the political identity of the alleged victim, and the 
nature of the alleged crime before deciding what action, if any, 
they are author ized to take.
Many agencies have attempted to ameliorate the problem of 
providing effective law enforcement in Indian country by enter-
ing into cooperative agreements with surrounding jurisdictions. 
These agreements expand the authority of offi cers who would 
otherwise be unable to enforce certain laws against certain indi-
viduals. Cooperative arrangements, including deputization, cross-
deputization, or mutual aid agreements, have proven instrumen-
tal in Indian country, allowing offi cers to more effectively protect 
the public from crime.
All questions relating to Indian country criminal jurisdiction 
must begin with determining whether the alleged crime occurred 
in Indian country.1 When the site of a crime is not Indian country, 
ordinary rules regarding state and federal criminal jurisdiction 
apply. Therefore, an offi cer must fi rst determine whether he or she 
is operating in Indian country. While this appears straightforward, 
the allotment of Indian lands in Michigan and the subsequent 
settlement of large portions of reservation lands by non-Indians 
have created a confusing “patchwork” of land ownership.
This article details the most effective solution to the jurisdic-
tional maze that exists in Michigan’s Indian country:2 cooperative 
public safety agreements between tribal and local law enforce-
ment jurisdictions.
Overview of the Contours of 
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
The primary Michigan Indian country law enforcement juris-
dictions are federal and tribal. Tribal governments have authority 
to prosecute their own citizens and other nonmember Indians,3
but they cannot prosecute non-Indians.4 Several federal statutes 
authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country fi ll the 
gaps. The Indian Country Crimes Act, enacted in 1817, author-
izes federal punishment for all crimes committed by non-Indians 
in Indian country and some crimes committed by Indians against 
non-Indians.5 The Assimilative Crimes Act, enacted in 1825, fi lls 
the gaps in criminal law that would other-
wise exist in exclusively federal enclaves such 
as Indian country by “assimilating” state law 
as federal law.6 The Major Crimes Act, en-
acted in 1885, provides for federal jurisdic-
tion over an Indian who commits one of sev-
eral enumerated crimes, including murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, incest, 
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury, assault against an individual 
under the age of 16, arson, burglary, robbery, and other crimes.7
Congress in the Trade and Intercourse Acts8 and later the Su-
preme Court9 have long enforced the general rule that state gov-
ernments have no jurisdiction in Indian country unless Congress 
has explicitly authorized state jurisdiction. The prosecution of 
crimes committed by non-Indians against persons and property 
in Indian country is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government.10 State governments have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed between non-Indians.11
The overlapping jurisdictional authority of these various agen-
cies can compound the task of enforcing criminal jurisdiction on 
Indian land. For example, a tribal law enforcement offi cer has no 
authority to arrest a non-Indian violating state law on the reser-
vation. Furthermore, state offi cers cannot respond to calls involv-
ing Indians on tribal land. Additionally, tribal law enforcement 
offi cers cannot enforce federal laws on reservation land without 
special authority.
In all these instances, an offi cer attempting to exercise author-
ity outside his or her jurisdiction merely has the authority to stop 
and detain a suspect.12 Finally, exacerbating the limitations on 
tribal and state law enforcement authority is the relative incapac-
ity of the federal government to prosecute crimes in Indian coun-
try. A Denver Post reporter concluded that “[b]etween 1997 and 
2006, federal prosecutors rejected nearly two-thirds of the reser-
vation cases brought to them by FBI and Bureau of Indian Affairs 
investigators, more than twice the rejection rate for all federally 
prosecuted crime.”13 However, the United States Attorney’s Offi ce 
for the Western District of Michigan, which has jurisdiction over 
11 of the 12 federally recognized tribes in Michigan, appears to 
be a leader in prosecuting Indian country crime.
Cooperative Public Safety Agreements
To help remedy these jurisdictional gaps, many agencies have 
entered into agreements that prescribe terms for shared authority 
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Cooperative arrangements, including 
deputization, cross-deputization, or 
mutual aid agreements, have proven 
instrumental in Indian country, allowing 
officers to more effectively protect 
the public from crime.
jurisdictional gaps, LTBB Chief of Police Jeff Cobe approached law 
enforcement offi ces in counties around tribal land in the late 1990s 
to negotiate a cross-deputization agreement. The idea was to cre-
ate seamless law enforcement in and around LTBB lands.
Initially, the tribe pushed for an agreement that would give 
its offi cers authority to enforce state laws within its reservation 
boundaries. However, this became a major stumbling block in 
the negotiations. After agreeing to put aside the issue of reserva-
tion boundaries, there were a series of meetings between the 
tribal police department, the tribal attorney, the county sheriff, 
and the prosecutor. In their fi nal form, the agreements limit the 
geographic scope to LTBB trust lands. Despite this concession, 
all parties were pleased with the outcome of the negotiations.18
At this time, all law enforcement agreements in Michigan are 
entered into at the local level. The following section analyzes the 
possible benefi ts of a statewide solution and the impediments to 
such agreements.
A Statewide Solution?
One considerable advantage for tribes entering into statewide 
agreements with the state police is the unlimited duration of such 
agreements. County sheriffs are elected to four-year terms only. 
As a consequence, offi cers deputized by a county sheriff must be 
sworn in again when a new sheriff takes offi ce. The new sheriff 
could simply refuse to honor the previous agreement. Adminis-
tratively, it is also easier to have one agreement on a state level 
than multiple agreements with various county sheriffs.
In addition, a statewide solution would provide backup au-
thority for tribal offi cers to enforce state laws against non-Indians 
in the tribe’s enforcement area in the event that the local or county 
sheriff is uncooperative. For political reasons or general distrust, 
a sheriff may decline to deputize a tribal offi cial. If a sheriff de-
clines to deputize tribal offi cers, they have no authority to enforce 
state laws against non-Indians. Thus, a statewide agreement could 
ensure that tribal authority is insulated against an individual sher-
iff’s distrust or dislike of tribal offi cials.
Law enforcement agencies in Michigan are generally eager to 
cooperate with one another to provide optimal law enforcement 
for their citizens. However, one impediment to statewide agree-
ments has been the possible liability issues these agreements can 
in and around Indian country. Deputization agreements give 
tribal, federal, state, or city law enforcement offi cials power to 
enforce laws outside their own jurisdictions regardless of the 
identity of the perpetrator, thus simplifying the exercise of crimi-
nal jurisdiction.
Cross-deputization agreements are frequently the product of 
intense and complicated negotiations between local and tribal 
authorities. Often, many barriers arise during negotiations. It ap-
pears that every element of an agreement mentioned previously 
can become a barrier, although some elements of the agreement 
are more contentious than others. Some of the more adversarial 
elements are the geographical reach of the agreements, the juris-
diction of the parties, liability of offi cers performing under the 
agreements, and sovereign immunity.14 For example, the law en-
forcement agreement between the Bay Mills Indian Community 
and Chippewa County provides only for the deputization of tribal 
offi cers to enforce state law and does not authorize county sher-
iff offi cers to enter tribal land to enforce tribal or state law.
Many tribes seeking to enter into cooperative agreements 
with local jurisdictions must demonstrate that both the tribe and 
the local government have authority to enter into such an agree-
ment. In 1973, Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley opined 
that “[s]tate, county and local police forces may freely enter into 
inter-agency arrangements with Indian police units and may en-
gage in other kinds of cooperative efforts which may seem advis-
able and practicable.”15 Michigan law now provides specifi c au-
thority for these agreements in the Urban Cooperation Act, as 
amended in 2002.16 One of the fi rst modern law enforcement co-
operative agreements, between Leelanau County and the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, negotiated be-
tween Sheriff Michael Oltersdorf and Tribal General Counsel John 
Petos key in 1997, serves as a model for agreements between tribes 
and local governments.17
Another example of a tribal and local government coopera-
tion is the agreement between the Little Traverse Bay Bands of 
Odawa Indians (LTBB) and their neighboring counties of Charle-
voix and Emmet. Before entering into a cross-deputization agree-
ment with the counties of Emmet and Charlevoix, the LTBB Tribal 
Council had passed a resolution allowing non-tribal law enforce-
ment to come into Indian country in the event of an emergency. 
To broaden the jurisdictional capabilities of tribal police and close 
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create. The Attorney General’s Offi ce, which protects state sher-
iffs regarding these issues, has identifi ed several concerns re-
garding statewide agreements with tribal police. These concerns 
mirror the impediments detailed above, suggesting they can be 
overcome through negotiations between the state and tribes. The 
concerns include the constitutionality under the Michigan Con-
stitution of deputizing tribal offi cers, the training or qualifi cation 
requirements of deputized tribal offi cers, the liability of the sher-
iffs regarding conduct of tribal offi cers, and the command and 
control of tribal offi cers acting as special deputies.
Attorney General Kelley’s 1973 opinion on the legality of a 
statewide agreement remains valid. State statutes regulate the 
training and qualifi cation of tribal police offi cers in cooperative 
agreements. Solutions to other impediments can also be negoti-
ated, as has happened many times locally, or addressed by the 
state legislature.
The advantage of a statewide solution for Indian country law 
enforcement is a question for all 12 tribal sovereigns and the state 
of Michigan. Despite the apparent authority in Michigan of state-
tribal agreements as evidenced by the attorney general opinion 
and statutes, the issue of a state police agreement or a state leg-
islative fi x has not been revisited for many years. This could be 
due to the perception that the solutions at the local level are 
working for tribal communities. However, tribes have options if 
they decide to revisit the issue, including pursuing a legislative 
fi x, opening negotiations with the state police, and addressing the 
issue with the governor’s offi ce or at the annual summit. ■
This article is an edited version of “Criminal Jurisdiction in 
Indian Country: The Solution of Cross Deputization” by Han-
nah Bobee, Allison Boisvenu, Anderson Duff, Kathryn E. Fort, 
and Wenona T. Singel. It is available at http://www.law.msu.edu/
indigenous/papers/2008-01.pdf.
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